he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló Université pontiicale catholique du Chili * 1. Introduction Citizen’s acceptance is one of the basic elements for governance in any political system. In fact, all political systems need the collaboration of the governed, although those which are perceived as illegitimate will require a larger proportion of coercion from the State apparatus to function. Anyhow, all political systems alternate the use of force with the voluntary compliance of the governed to fulil their goals. he proportion of violence that a system requires increases when its results are perceived as unfair, and decreases when citizens are participants of its successes. he wider the perception of unfairness, the larger the proportion the elite will have to invest in coercion to sustain the political order and, therefore, the system will have a smaller ability to expand and develop. In North’s words: “he costs of maintenance of an existing order are inversely related to the perceived legitimacy of the existing system” 1. In participatory political systems, as modern democracy, citizen’s acceptance is fundamental, for their active involvement is required for the system to work, even at the most basic level in order to convince them to go to the polls every number of years. It is not a coincidence that democracy only acquired stability in continental Europe ater the world wars, which unleashed one of the most massive processes of economic equalization known to humankind 2. he wealth of old elites simply vanished through inlation — caused by the abandon of gold standard —, physical destruction of capital and the stock shocks of the Great Depression. * Professor of Roman Law of the Pontiicia Universidad Católica de Chile, Facultad de Derecho, piso 4º, Alameda 340, Santiago de Chile; camunate@uc.cl. his work was supported by Conicyt by grant Fondecyt Regular 1141231 and Anillos de Investigación Asociativa project SOC 1111. 1. D.C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York 1981, p. 53. 2. Piketty, on the matter gives some interesting data on wealth distribution in England and France during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. he most striking feature is the enormous equalization process that took place ater the two World Wars and the Great Depression. See: T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, 2014, pp. 126–139. Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 5 05-07-15 15:32:15  6 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló his brutal equalization brought the decline of inheritance as the main source of wealth 3, compared to the new possibilities that were open for the common man if he had access to education. he collapse of wealth concentration during the wars, brought a new social system that was perceived as egalitarian, where education and hard work were considered as the foundations of wealth. his is the substrate that has stabilized the political regimes of Western European societies, avoiding the emergence of totalitarian political regimes that could jeopardize their development. In contrast, Latin American societies, were no such collapse happened, have being periodically afected by totalitarian tendencies. Anyhow, during the last thirty years, wealth accumulation has been rapidly increasing in Europe and the United States 4 and, consequently, a long list of populist organizations have being emerging from the bowels of their political systems, as the Tea Party or the Front National, and other political movements of doubtful democratic credentials. Evidently, we cannot know if these political groups are the outpost or an authoritarian drit in the self proclaimed “advanced democracies”, but if the wealth concentration process deepens, this is perfectly possible. his work is a comparative exercise that will take the case of a diferent society, the Roman republic, where wealth accumulation brought the decline of a participatory political regime, which was inally replaced by the Empire. 2. Wealth Concentration and Middle Class in Republican Rome Before treating the governance problems that afected Antiquity, it is important to consider some key points regarding the creation and distribution of wealth that afect all pre-industrial societies. Firstly, it should be taken into account that in such societies economic growth is negligible and, therefore, any increase in population will necessarily imply a new provision of dispossessed whose survival is uncertain 5. Antiquity is a Malthusian world, where increases in productivity accomplished by technical innovation are soon absorbed by population increases that lead to new social crisis 6. In such conditions, the most efective way to increase the GDP is to expand the mass of ixed capital through military conquest of the 3. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, 2014, p. 377. 4. J. Stiglitz, he Price of Inequality. How today’s divided society endangers our future. New York and London 2013, p. 1–27. 5. W.V. Harris, ‘Poverty and Destitution in the Roman Empire’, in Rome’s Imperial Economy, Twelve Essays. Oxford and New York, Kindle Ed. 2011, l. 349. 6. On economic growth in Antiquity, the debate seems nowadays to be centred on the speed in which population growth can absorb the positive efects of economic growth (W. Scheidel, ‘Physical well-being’, in W. Scheidel [ed.], he Cambridge Companion to he Roman Economy, Cambridge 2012, pp. 321–333; R. Saller, ‘Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy’, in W. Scheidel and S. Von Reden [eds.], he Ancient Economy, New York 2010, pp. 251–269; P. Temin, he Roman Market Economy, New Jersey 2013, pp. 195–239). Amunategui.indd 6 05-07-15 15:32:15  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 7 neighbouring territories 7. his is the cause for war’s central role in Antiquity, for it meant something equivalent to economic growth. Antiquity’s military obsession was especially important for societies that had to deal with demographic growth or that held political systems that were involved in the efective amelioration of life conditions for the governed. hat is why democracies in Antiquity were invariably imperialistic, while aristocracies not necessarily. Another element to consider is that Antiquity’s economic structure was not favourable for paid work. Although is existed 8, its economic role was marginal, especially for the ubiquitous presence of slavery 9, as for other strategies to obtain subordinate labour typical of earlier Antiquity 10. Diferently to Modern world 11, distribution of wealth and capital were equivalent. he irrelevance of economic growth and the dependence of income to capital implied that any governance crisis might quickly translate into propositions of agrarian reform, especially regarding newly conquered land. 3. Land Distribution and the Licinan-Sextian Laws Following Roman historians, the eve of the Republic was rather shaky in social terms. Tradition reports a long struggle between two social groups, the Patricians and the Plebeians, whose origins are not clear 12. his conlict would have developed 7. In Morley’s words: “the importance of violence as a mode of accumulation and a cultural practice in antiquity can scarcely be exaggerated” (N. Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge, Kindle Ed. 2007, l. 505). 8. Recently the role of paid labour in Antiquity is under re-examination. he possibility of a real labour market has being put forward (W.V. Harris, ‘Poverty and Destitution in the Roman Empire’, in Rome’s Imperial Economy, Twelve Essays. Oxford and New York, Kindle Ed. 2011, l. 546–578; D. Kehoe, ‘Contract labor’ in W. Scheidel [ed.] Roman Economy, New York 2012, pp. 114–131). he most extreme position on the matter points to the existence of a large labour market fully operative during the Early Empire (P. Temin, he Roman Market Economy, New Jersey 2013, pp. 114–138). 9. Slavery seems to have being introduced during Etruscan monarchy, although we cannot be certain of it (G. Franciosi, ‘Res mancipi e res nec mancipi’, Labeo 5–3 [1959], p. 375; G. Franciosi, Famiglia e persone in Roma antica, Turin 1992, p. 206; F. De Martino, ‘Clienti e condizioni materiali in Roma arcaica’, in Diritto economia e società nel mondo romano, Naples 1997, pp. 82–83; F. De Martino, ‘Intorno all’origine della schiavitù a Roma’, in Diritto economía e società nel mondo romano, Naples 1997, pp. 27–57). 10. Among them, we should mention the clientela, with its connected obligation of lending personal service to the patronus, nexum, a loan guaranteed with the physical person of the debtor, and the transfer of sons and daughters through mancipium. 11. In modern world the distribution of income and capital are diferent. Generally speaking, capital tends to be much more concentrated than income, for the latter includes paid work. See: T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge 2014, p. 39–71. 12. he theories about the origins of Patricians and Plebeians are discouragingly many. Some are based on a dualist hypothesis where there would be either an ethnical diference between them (V. Arangio-Ruiz, Storia del diritto romano. Naples 2006, p. 21), or at least regarding their Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 7 05-07-15 15:32:15  8 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló for three key elements: legal knowledge, access to political power and the control of public land. Although academic debate has literally being going on for centuries, we will only partially face the problem of land and its distribution as an element of our analysis. Some scholars believe that the whole conlict is a mere invention of the annalistic tradition, a kind of pseudo-historic anticipation of the real conlict for land control that took place during the 2nd century BC 13. Anyhow, there are enough elements in the tradition to discard this thesis partially or completely, citizenship (A. Guarino, Le origine quiritarie. Raccolta di Scritti romanistici, Naples 1973, pp. 9–17). Others believe that the Patrician and Plebeian groups formed gradually during the Monarchy, either by the fulilment of priestly duties (R.E. Mitchell, ‘he Deinition of patres and plebs: An End to the Struggle of the Orders’, in K.A. Raaflaub [ed.], Social Struggles in Archaic Rome. New Prespectives on the Conlict of the Orders, Oxford 2005, pp. 128–167), by a process of wealth accumulation connected with the exercise of power in the Senate (L. Harmand, Société et économie de la république romaine, Paris 1976, p. 32; A. Drummond, ‘Rome in the Fith Century II: he Citizen Community’, in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen and R.M. Ogilvie [eds.], he Cambridge Ancient History, VII, p. 2, Cambridge 1989, pp. 172–242; A. Momigliano, ‘he Origins of Rome’, in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen and R.M. Ogilvie [eds.], he Cambridge Ancient History, VII, p. 2, Cambridge 1989, pp. 52–112 and A. Momigliano, ‘he Rise of the plebs in the Archaic Age of Rome’, in K.A. Raaflaub [ed.], Social Struggles in Archaic Rome. New Prespectives on the Conlict of the Orders, Oxford 2005, pp. 168–184; A. Magdelain, ‘De L’auctoritas patrum à l’auctoritas senatus’, in Jus imperium auctoritas. Études de droit romain, Paris 1990, pp. 385–403; T.J. Cornell, he Beginnings of Rome and Italy from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), London and New York 1995, pp. 244–258; K.A. Raaflaub, ‘From Protection and Defense to Ofense and Participation: Stages in the Conlict of the Orders’, in K.A. Raaflaub [ed.], Social Struggles in Archaic Rome. New Prespectives on the Conlict of the Orders, Oxford 2005, pp. 185–222; G. Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006, p. 162; C.J. Smith he Roman Clan. he gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology, Cambridge 2006, p. 305), or through the immigration of cratsmen of a predominantly urban environment (Plebeians), confronted to an agrarian aristocracy (J.-C. Richard, ‘Rélexions sur les “origines” de la plebe’, in Bilancio critico su Roma arcaica fra monarchia e repubblica, Rome 1993, pp. 27–41 and J.-C. Richard, ‘Patricians and Plebeians: he Origin of a Social Dichotomy’, in K.A. Raaflaub [ed.] Social Struggles in Archaic Rome. New Prespectives on the Conlict of the Orders, Oxford 2005, p. 107–127), which eventually closed its ranks at the beginnings of the Republic. What we believe most likely, is that the Patricians were the members of the old gentilician clans, while the Plebs were outsiders (F. De Martino, ‘La gens, lo stato e le classi in Roma antica’, in Diritto economía e società nel mondo romano, Naples 1997, pp. 25–49 and F. De Martino, Storia costituzionale romana, Naples 1973, p. 78; P. Bonfante, ‘La gens e la familia’, in Scritti Guiridici, Famiglia e successione, Turin 1916, pp. 1–17 and P. Bonfante, ‘Teorie vecchie e nuove sulle formazione sociali primitive’, in Scritti Guiridici, Famiglia e successione, Turin 1916, pp. 18–63; C. Castello, Studi suldiritto familiar e gentilizio romano, Rome 1972 [=1942], p. 49; L. Capogrossi Colognesi, Diritto e potere nella storia di Roma, Naples 2007, pp. 49–51). 13. R. Maschke, Zur heorie und Geschichte der römischen Agrargesetze, Naples 1980 [=1906], p. 14; E. Gabba, ‘Motivazioni economiche nell’opposizione alla lege agraria di Tib. Sempronio Graccho’, in J.A.S. Evans (ed.), Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon, Toronto 1974, p. 135. Amunategui.indd 8 05-07-15 15:32:15  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 9 and to conirm the existence of a conlict over land control between these groups during the Early Republic 14. Apparently the Plebeian group did not have access to the newly conquered lands, which remained as public lands (ager publicum), theoretically open to the use of any citizen 15. We do not know the exact reason for this exclusion, but in practice, it seems only the Patricians had access to them 16 and they were the only ones that efectively occupied them. he struggle of the orders had at its core the Plebeian demand for land distribution. he disruptive efects of agrarian reform laws are classically expressed in Livy’s comment on the major public disorders caused by them 17. Anyhow, the conlict inally lowered its intensity only ater 367 BC, ater some 140 years of permanent hostility, with the leges Liciniae-Sextiae. hese statutes, among other major reforms, limited the maximal amount of public land that any individual could occupy. From this moment onwards, each military victory was accompanied by a land distribution of the conquered territory, whether in the 14. F. Serrao, ‘Lotte per la terra e per la casa a Roma’, in F. Serrao (ed.), Legge e società nella repubblica romana, Naples, p. 67; A. Drummond, ‘Rome in the Fith Century II: he Citizen Community’, in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen and R.M. Ogilvie (eds.), he Cambridge Ancient History, VII, p. 2, Cambridge 1989, p. 237; S.T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic. A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC. Oxford and New York 2010, p. 28. 15. Sic. Fl. De condic. agr. 101.9–13 and 102.9–13. 16. he Patrician control of public land is quite straight forward in the tradition. Nonnius reports that the Plebeians were excluded of the public land just because they were Plebeians (Non. 149M.17: Quicumque propter plebitatem agro publico eiecti sunt). Although the reasons for this exclusion are unknown to us, we could theorize that their exclusion from the gentes, the original clans that composed the city, might lay behind it. Another possibility is that they simply lacked the social power to impose their control over public lands and that more powerful people (the the rich Patrician) could simply expel them by violence. Anyhow, during the monarchy, tradition reports many land distributions made by the kings to favour the poor (Dion Hal. 2.62.2–3; 3.1.4–5; 2.29.6; 3.31.3; 3.9.8; 4.10.3; 4.13.1), but during the early Republic these distributions cease abruptly. By that time, the conquered land usually remains as ager publicus, save from some rather exceptional cases in which colonies were established (Liv. 2.21.6; 2.31.4; 2.34.6; 3.1.5–6). he irst massive land distribution during the Republic is not of agricultural land, but rather of urban space, through the lex Icilia of 456 BC, which distributed the Aventine. On the other hand, according to the tradition, the Plebeian demands for the distribution of public land happen almost on a yearly basis, with more than ten bills rejected by the patres between 486 and 456 BC (L. Capogrossi Colognesi, La terra in Roma antica, Rome 1981, p. 6; A. Manzo, La lex licinia sextia de modo agrorum, Naples 2001, pp. 40–45; A. Russo, ‘Tiberio Gracco e la riforma agraria’, in G. Franciosi (ed.), La romanizzazione della Campania antica, Naples 2002, pp. 161–193; C.J. Smith, he Roman Clan. he gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology, Cambridge 2006, p. 240 and S.T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic. A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC, Oxford and New York 2010, pp. 26–29). 17. Liv. 2.41.3: lex agraria promulgata est, nunquam deinde usque ad hanc memoriam sine maximis motibus rerum agitata. Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 9 05-07-15 15:32:15  10 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló form of a direct assignation to the poor citizens, or through the foundation of a citizen’s colony 18. Appian describes the process in the following paragraph 19: “Romans, while they conquered Italy’s diferent regions, took part of their territory and established cities, or levied their own colonists to send them to the already existent ones.” It is interesting to corroborate the annalistic tradition with the information that archaeology ofers. On the matter, from the 4th century BC a true explosion of modest size settlements can be detected in Central Italy, which can be correlated with land division and its occupation by smallholders in a process directly linked with the leges Liciniae-Sextiae 20. his policy of land distribution of the newly conquered land to the poor is a key element to explain the high levels of governance and the military push that Rome enjoyed during the Middle Republic. he city was socially cohesive, for the common perception was that the beneits from public activity — mainly war — were on the beneit of the common citizen, especially the poorer ones. War became a popular activity because it implied a source of economic beneits to the citizenry and supported socio-economic stability of the city. Military success meant a massive input of ixed capital, an increase in the GDP and, therefore, economic growth. In Harris’ words, Rome exported her poor to Italy and later to the provinces 21. Nearly seventy thousand men (and their families) received land ater the Samnite wars only 22. 4. Middle Class during Hannibal’s Wars he beneits of war implied growth of the GDP. his growth was distributed among the citizenry directly through land distribution, which supported the creation of what could be called the Roman middle class. Although the concept of Middle Class is naturally exotic to Roman ideas, following Harris 23, we could 18. It is not known for certain how much land was usually taken from the defeated enemy. It is usually said that about a third of its territory was coniscated, although there were occasions in which this number could increase up to two thirds (S.T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic. A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC, Oxford and New York 2010, pp. 31–37). 19. App. BC 1.1.7: Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολέμῳ κατὰ μέρη χειρούμενοι γῆς μέρος ἐλάμβανον καὶ πόλεις ἐνῴκιζον ἢ ἐς τὰς πρότερον οὔσας κληρούχους ἀπὸ σφῶν κατέλεγον. 20. N. Terrenato, ‘he essential Countryside’, in Susan E. Alcock and Robin Osborne (eds.), Classical Archeology, Malden and Oxford 2012, pp. 147–148. 21. W.V. Harris, ‘Poverty and Destitution in the Roman Empire’, in Rome’s Imperial Economy, Twelve Essays, Oxford and New York, Kindle Ed. 2011, l. 439. 22. T.J. Cornell, he Beginnings of Rome and Italy from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000– 264 BC), London and New York 1995, p. 405. 23. W.V. Harris, ‘On the Applicability of the Concept of Class in Roman History’, in Rome’s Imperial Economy, Twelve Essays, Oxford and New York, Kindle Ed. 2011, l. 308–315. Amunategui.indd 10 05-07-15 15:32:15  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 11 classify the Roman population according to a highly lexible criterion, which is ultimately taken from Aristotle. We could distinguish between those who can live depending on alien labour — from slaves or other dependent people —, those who have enough property to secure their family’s well-being through their own work in their land and those who are dependant workers, whether they are free or slave 24. In this sense, those who beneit from the land distribution policy of Middle Republican Rome become a kind of Middle Class. Naturally, we cannot directly quantify its importance in Roman social structure, for we do not have reliable statistics about poverty, wealth or even the number of slaves living in Rome at any point of history. Nevertheless, we do have one relatively trust worthy piece of information that could, to some point, help us to do a gross estimate of its extension. hat is the number of active legions in Rome. he Republican army was recruited according to wealth. Only people who had some property could be levied, while the proletarians — the have-nots —, until the Marian reform were excluded. On the matter we have very precise information thanks to Livy’s account 25, which might be anachronistic for Etruscan Rome, but seems trust worthy for Middle Republican society. Livy tells us that the census divided the army according to wealth into ive classes. hose who were under the minimum wealth fell into the infraclassem of the proletarii and were excluded from the army. It is likely that ater the introduction of a salary for military service in 406 BC, legions were recruited indistinctly from the ive wealthy classes 26, granted that they were above the minimum level of proletarians. During the Second Punic War, Rome was taken to the very limits of her military capacity, levying some years up to twenty ive legions. Each legion, according to Polybius 27, would have at least four thousand two hundred men, although the igure could be higher and some legions would have up to six thousand men. If we take a median of ive thousand men per legion, this would give us some 125 24. Following a similar criterion, Knapp speaks of the ordinary man in Rome, deining him as the man that is socially below the senators and equestrians, but over the slave and day labourer (R. Knapp, Invisible Romans, Cambridge 2011, p. 5). 25. Liv. 1.43. he text describes Servius Tullius’ reform, which would introduce the centuriae as the basic units of military organization. he numbers supplemented by Livy are rather unbelievable for monarchic Rome, for they would imply the existence of an army of almost twenty thousand men, for a city that did not have more than ity thousand inhabitants. he most likely hypothesis is that such description is possibly based on the data established ater the reform of 241 BC (T.J. Cornell, he Beginnings of Rome and Italy from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), London and New York 1995, p. 180; C.J. Smith, he Roman Clan. he gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology, Cambridge 2006, p. 174; G. Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006, p. 113). 26. According to Polybius, the minimum would be 400 drachmas during 216 BC. Polib. Hist. 6.19 (8). 27. Polib. Hist. 6.20.8. Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 11 05-07-15 15:32:15  12 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló thousand men who could meet the minimum property standards to be part of the army. If we consider that adult male population in Ancient cities was usually around twenty ive per cent of the total population 28 29, this igure implies a total population with a middle living standard of about ive hundred thousand men. Although the total population of Italy at the time should have being around three million inhabitants 30, Roman population shortly ater Hannibal’s war was surveyed at 243,704 male citizens 31. If we suppose that men were about half of the population — something not necessarily true in a period of catastrophic military campaigns —, the total population of adult Roman citizens would be around 480 thousand people, to which we should add a number of boys and girls under twelve and fourteen years respectively, that usually were not counted in the census. Following Saller’s 32 population igures, with a life expectancy of about twenty ive years, the igure would imply about a ity per cent of the total population (given that infant mortality between 0 and 10 years would reach almost half of the births), while if we take his upper igure of 32.5 years of life expectancy, adult population would be about sixty per cent of the total. In short, the census igure implies a total population between 800 and 960 Roman citizens, including children. Although the igures we are considering are far from exact and they simply give us an order of magnitude, they seem to tell us that between a ity two and a sixty two per cent of Roman citizenry would have enough property to face everyday needs 33. his is a relatively high igure for what we could call Roman Middle class. It is true that in this igure we are deliberately ignoring the situation both of slaves and resident foreigners, but the igure is anyhow expressive. Most Roman citizens had 28. K.A. Raaflaub, ‘he Conlict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach’, in K.A. Raaflaub (ed.), Social Struggles in Archaic Rome. New Prespectives on the Conlict of the Orders, Oxford 2005, p. 22. 29. For a complete study using higher and lower life expectancies: W. Scheidel, ‘Demography’, in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller (eds.), he Cambrgidge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge 2007, p. 40. 30. T.J. Cornell, he Beginnings of Rome and Italy from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), London and New York 1995, p. 180; C.J. Smith, he Roman Clan. he gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology, Cambridge 2006, p. 174; G. Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006, p. 405; W. Scheidel, ‘Demography’, in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R.P. Saller (eds.), he Cambrgidge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge 2007, p. 45. 31. Liv. 35.9.21.1. On the reliability of Republican census igures: E. Lo Cascio, ‘Population and Demographic Studies’, in J. Derose Evans (ed.), A Companion to the Archeology of the Roman Republic, Oxford 2013, pp. 155–166. 32. R. Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family, Cambridge 1994, p. 25. 33. Our igures are slightly more optimistic than Brunt’s, that estimated the total number of assidui in about a ity per cent of the population (P. Brunt, Italian Manpower, London 1971, pp. 64– 66), but signiicantly lower than Rosenstein’s, who estimates the total percentage of proletarii in about a ten per cent of the population during Hannibal’s War (N. Rosenstein, Rome at War, Chapel Hill and London 2004, pp. 185–188). Amunategui.indd 12 05-07-15 15:32:15  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 13 enough wealth to live independently, working their own land and serving in the army during Hannibal’s war. Regarding the elite, we have no way to quantify it, nor to measure the resources it accumulated, but it was always a rather small group. here were no more than three hundred senators and if we suppose a ten times larger group of equites and add up their families, the igure could not be more than twelve hundred people, about one per cent of the total population. To sum up, and to return to Harris’ categories, we could say that Roman population was divided into an elite that comprehended about one per cent of the population, a Middle class that accounted about 55–60% of population and have-nots that were between forty and forty ive per cent of the total. hese igures sound awfully familiar and are not very diferent to the ones a modern democracy would put forward today. Republican political system was based on a middle class that gave Rome its social ideal of a man that was also a soldier, a citizen and a farmer. his archetype was the model of Republican civic life, an ideological incarnation of its virtues. Cincinnatus, who works his small farm, who was called to save the Republic and who returns the scarlet of dictatorship iteen days ater assuming the magistracy, represents the Republican ideal. he common man, farmer, soldier and citizen, assumes him as a model and can imagine himself a protector of the Republic. Rome’s conquest of Italy was backed by a harmonious political system, where its citizens were directly beneited by the prosperity gained. Support for the Republican system was unanimous. With some excess, this political system has being described as Roman democracy 34. It is beyond doubt that it was a participatory political system, where citizenry, through the comitia and the tribunes held power, and the common man not only had a voice in the decisions taken by the political apparatus, but also beneited from the results. Its costs of maintenance were extremely low, to the point that Rome did not have a police to impose order, nor a bureaucracy to administrate the system. To call it a democracy or not is a merely semantic problem. 5. he Decline of the Middle Classes in the Late Republic Rome’s social order declines quickly ater Hannibal’s war. he process has being described in several occasions and it can be related to diferent economic and social phenomena that the military successes of Roman policy implied. From our point of view, the most important one was the insertion of Rome in Mediterranean long distance trade markets 35. 34. A. Guarino, ‘Forma e materia della costituzione romana’, in Studi di diritto costituzionale romano, Naples 2008, pp. 11–26. 35. his is what Harris calls the Hellenistic-Carthaginian system, which had being operating as a trade system from the East side to the West side of the Mediterranean basin during centuries (W.V. Harris, ‘he Late Republic’, in W. Scheidel, I. Morris and R.P. Saller [eds.], he Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge 2007, p. 513). Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 13 05-07-15 15:32:15  14 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló Most of Roman smallholders were corn producers, although they usually cultivated vines and olives too, a typical feature of the Mediterranean colotora promiscua, which was in use in Central Italy since the seventh century BC, at least 36. It was aimed fundamentally to self consumption, though the surpluses were usually traded to acquire a wide range of goods that they could not produce by themselves. Nevertheless, Roman conquests putted into market vast quantities of superior quality grain, which entered gratis from Sicily — as a tribute — or at very low prices, from Egypt and Africa. his immediately expelled smallholders from grain markets, who simply could not compete. he result was the abandon of farms by many smallholders. Even in the immediate hinterland of Rome, where low transportation costs should help smallholders, farms were abandoned 37. he integration of Rome into the Mediterranean markets did not only have negative efects, but it also presented opportunities to the elite, which was in a position to beneit with the Imperial expansion. he new markets opened vast opportunities for agribusiness, especially for the exportation of wine, oil and honey. Nevertheless, most farmers could not beneit from these opportunities. Smallholders grew a crop optimized to satisfy their own corn needs. To alter this optimum and favour a new equilibrium to get surpluses of oil or wine for exportation would expose the farmer to famine 38. herefore, his possibilities to adapt to this new scenario were meagre. Even more, the farmer lacked the capital needed for the conversion 39. he wars conducted outside Italy brought a huge inlux of liquid capital, which came from the monetization of the riches accumulated by the Hellenistic kings, whose vast reserves of silver were minted 40. his inlux reverted in the beneit of the Roman elite, who could acquire through purchase or simple violence, the farms that smallholders were in the process of abandoning. With this capital they could create new productive units that were intended to produce surpluses for exportation and were majorly worked by slaves. hese were the Roman villas. Appian puts some vivid colours to the situation 41: “he rich, hogging most of the undistributed land, with time became conident that they were not going to be dispossessed. Partly buying through persuasive 36. G. Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2006, p. 56. 37. N. Rosenstein, Rome at War, Chapel Hill and London 2004, p. 7. 38. K. Roberts, Origins of Business, Money and Markets, New York, Kinlde Ed. 2011, l. 2749. 39. Nevertheless, some small farms were able to do it and produced surpluses for exportation (S.T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic. A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396–89 BC, Oxford and New York 2010, pp. 155–156). 40. For a detailed account see: P. Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, Oxford 2014, pp. 87–106). 41. App. BC 1.1.7.18: οἱ γὰρ πλούσιοι τῆσδε τῆς ἀνεμήτου γῆς τὴν πολλὴν καταλαβόντες καὶ χρόνῳ θαρροῦντες οὔ τινα σφᾶς ἔτι ἀφαιρήσεσθαι τά τε ἀγχοῦ σφίσιν ὅσα τε ἦν ἄλλα βραχέα πενήτων, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενοι πειθοῖ, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ λαμβάνοντες, πεδία μακρὰ ἀντὶ χωρίων ἐγεώργουν, ὠνητοῖς ἐς αὐτὰ γεωργοῖς καὶ ποιμέσι χρώμενοι… Amunategui.indd 14 05-07-15 15:32:15  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 15 methods, partly seizing through violence, they acquired the neighbouring properties and all the others that belonged to humble peasants, to cultivate latifundia…” A bit further he adds 42: “For these reasons the rich became maximally wealthy and the slaves abounded in the countryside, while famine and scarce population alicted the Italian people, decimated by poverty, taxes and military service.” Besides the problems related to markets, war ceased to be of beneit for the general well being of citizenry. he devastating efects of the military occupation of Italy by Hannibal’s troops for nearly twenty years have being held responsible for the decline of the Italian smallholder 43, although they might have not had the importance traditionally attributed to them 44. An element that might have deeper consequences is the development of long distance conlicts of indeinite duration. Until Hannibal’s war, military campaigns were seasonal event that happened inside the Italian peninsula, relatively close to the citizen-soldier’s home, who could return to their properties in winter with the end of hostilities. War did not interfere with agricultural labour. On the other side, the military campaigns for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin required a permanent estrangement of the peasant from his land to develop operations in distant war scenarios. he conquest of Hispania implied the creation of a permanent occupation force, as also happened later with other provinces and ended up transforming the old Mediterranean into a new Mare Nostrum. his kind of war is incompatible with the farmer-soldier, and it ruined a large portion of the Roman middle class. Plutarch let us an interesting description 45: “he dispossessed poor did not enrol in the army, nor could feed their children. Italy was in risk of becoming completely deserted of free population and crowded with barbarian prisoners, for they worked the lands of the wealthy, excluding the citizens.” Although there were various attempts to implement agrarian reforms that could revert the disastrous results of Roman military expansion, none was able 42. App. BC 1.1.7.28: ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων οἱ μὲν δυνατοὶ πάμπαν ἐπλούτουν, καὶ τὸ τῶν θεραπόντων γένος ἀνὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλήθυε, τοὺς δ’ Ἰταλιώτας ὀλιγότης καὶ δυσανδρία κατελάμβανε, τρυχομένους πενίᾳ τε καὶ ἐσφοραῖς καὶ στρατείαις. 43. P. Brunt, ‘he Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution’, Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), pp. 69–86 and P. Brunt, Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays, Oxford, 1988, 73. 44. N. Rosenstein, Rome at War, Chapel Hill and London 2004, pp. 26–62. 45. Plut. Gracch. 8.4.1–8.5.1: ἐξωσθέντες οἱ πένητες οὔτε ταῖς στρατείαις ἔτι προθύμους παρεῖχον ἑαυτούς, ἠμέλουν τε παίδων ἀνατροφῆς, ὡς ταχὺ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἅπασαν ὀλιγανδρίας ἐλευθέρων αἰσθέσθαι, δεσμωτηρίων δὲ βαρβαρικῶν ἐμπεπλῆσθαι, δι› ὧν ἐγεώργουν οἱ πλούσιοι τὰ χωρία, τοὺς πολίτας ἐξελάσαντες. Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 15 05-07-15 15:32:15  16 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló to reconstruct the old class of farmers that were the backbone of the Republican system. he necessity of reforms was evident during the second half of the second century BC, when Gaius Laelius 46 makes such a proposal, which he eventually had to retire, under senatorial opposition. More important were Tiberius and Gaius Grachus reforms, which intended to rebuild the Roman smallholder class in order to increase the availability of recruits for the legions. hey passed their laws even against the elite’s violent answer. Anyhow, these bills were unable to revert the decline of the smallholder. he demand for an agrarian reform was at the very heart of every revolutionary movement and civil war that stormed the Republic during its last century 47. Finally, when Augustus transformed the old Republic into the Principate, Rome´s participatory government ceased to exist, as the demand for an agrarian reform. he decline of smallholders caused the displacement of countryside population to Rome, which experienced a rapid increase in population, unparalleled until the early twentieth century’s migratory movements. Rome increased its urban population from 200–300 thousand inhabitants, during the late third century, to a million, during the Late Republic. Rome became a city of favelas, where the poor lived in slums over its hills, always fearing pestilence and ire. It is almost impossible to quantify the process and to put some numbers on the decline of Roman middle classes. Nevertheless, we can grasp the efects of such crisis in the lack of eligible men for military service. During the late second century, with a war burden signiicantly lower to the one experienced during Hannibal’s war and a larger population, Rome was simply incapable of meeting the needs of the levy. Only with Marius’ reform, which admitted for the irst time the proletarians into the army 48, the legions could be recruited. From then on, the army became the refuge of the poorest citizens, who saw in the legions a way out of their misery and in the personal success of their generals, their only chance to ensure themselves some means of subsistence. During the second century BC Rome levied between eight and twelve legions every year, that is to say, between forty and sixty thousand men 49. Citizen population had grown up to almost four hundred thousand men, according to census 50. If we repeat the calculation previously made 51 for Hannibal’s war, we 46. Plut. Gracch. 8.5. 47. P. Brunt, ‘he Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution’, Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), pp. 69–86. 48. Plut. Marius 9. 49. See the table included in Rosenstein (N. Rosenstein, Rome at War, Chapel Hill and London 2004, pp. 120–121). 50. he summary quotes 394,336 citizens in the census. See: Liv. Perioch. 63. 51. hat is to say, taking the maximal number of the recruited (60 thousand), the number of assidui (that is, men over the property limit) would be about 240 thousand. If we add to the nearly 400 thousand men older than fourteen years, the missing proportion of women and children we Amunategui.indd 16 05-07-15 15:32:16  he Decline of the Middle Class and the Fall of the Roman Republic 17 would get to the conclusion that, before Marius’ reform, Rome was not able to stand a military burden that implied the existence of iteen and eighteen per cent of what we earlier called middle class. he result is eloquent. Although the numbers are not precise and are afected by various caveat, the order of magnitude is probably correct. his would corroborate what tradition tells us about the decline of Roman middle class, which diminishes from covering almost two thirds of the population, to less than a ith. he governance crisis was inevitable, and the destruction of the Republican political system, unavoidable. 6. Conclusions Our conclusions are, to some point, a conirmation of North’s theory. he costs of maintenance of political system are inversely proportional to its legitimacy. he viability of a participatory political system is directly related with the beneits the population acquires from it. If the system tends to the creation of a large middle class, the system will consolidate. If it the real opportunities of personal advancement are reduced and it pauperizes the middle class, it will inevitably implode and succumb before the ambitions of the destabilizing elements of society that will try to replace it, either by a system that efectively distributes wealth or by a diferent system that asserts its stability in a deeper use of coercion and social control. In the Roman case, it was the Principate that raised from the ashes of the Republic, a non participatory political system, which favoured commerce and social stability. he coercion level required to operate was higher than during the Republic, although much lower than the later despotisms. Nowadays, the rise of inequality in income distribution experienced in the United States and Western Europe is rather alarming. If it deepens, the participatory nature of their political regimes might jeopardise. he fall of what we have called Roman middle class occurred in a relatively short period of time, less than a century, although its efects were obvious earlier. Populism was the result of the destruction of these middle classes. he efects of populism are not new; even the Romans knew them well. hese are the irst symptoms of social and political decomposition. would arrive to a total population between 1,3 and 1,6 million citizens, depending of the life expectancy we choose. his would give a proportion of eighteen to iteen per cent of propertied citizens over the minimum census. Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 56 (2014) Amunategui.indd 17 05-07-15 15:32:16  18 Carlos Felipe Amunátegui Perelló Amunategui.indd 18 05-07-15 15:32:16